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Abstract 
The Beijing metro system is owned by a state-owned company on behalf of the government who fully financed its 
construction. The service provision and equipment replacement are delegated to semi-private or state-owned 
operating companies. To meet the public affordability, the fare in Beijing metro system is heavily regulated by the 
government. The fare income however does not cover the cost of operating company. Government subsidy is 
therefore required to ensure the sustainable operation of Beijing metro. Cost-plus and fixed-price contracts are 
commonly used subsidy contract, but they lack incentives to reduce the amount of government subsidy. This paper 
proposes introduction of incentives to the contract to reduce the amount of government subsidy while the resulting 
equipment reliability does not compromise service quality and safety. In the proposed contract, the government first 
pays an agreed sum and then shares the deviation of the final cost from the agreed price with the operating company. 
An illustrative study demonstrates that the proposed incentive scheme is able to encourage the operating companies 
to reduce their costs and thus the government subsidy while the level of service safety and quality are upheld.  
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Beijing Jiaotong 
University (BJU) and Systems Engineering Society of China (SESC).   
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1. Introduction 
With drastic growth of vehicle numbers and population in Beijing, congestion mitigation is becoming 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel: 8610-13401011428. 
E-mail address: yunbai@bjtu.edu.cn. 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or eer review under responsibil ty of Beijing Jiaotong 
[ ], Systems Engineering Society of China (SESC) Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
719 Yun Bai et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  43 ( 2012 )  718 – 727 
more challenging in urban traffic. Metro system is one of the key public transportation means to alleviate 
traffic jams, because of its high capacity, reliability and efficiency.  Beijing government devotes 
substantial effort to develop metro in recent years.  There are 15 metro lines in service and several new 
ones are under construction.  The metro already carries 25% of the passenger traffic in the city in 2010 
(Guo et al, 2011). 
The Beijing metro system, including rail tracks, vehicles and other equipments, is owned by Beijing 
Infrastructure Investment Company (BII) which is wholly owned by the Beijing government.  The 
operations of metro are delegated to semi-private or stated-owned companies by means of a fixed-term 
regulatory contract.  The companies are responsible for not only train service provision, but also 
equipment replacement (ER) if needed.  However, passenger fare is regulated by the government to meet 
the public affordability.  The price of a Beijing subway train ticket is only 2 ̞ per person for a single trip, 
regardless of the distance travelled.  The income does not cover the cost of operation.  Government 
subsidy is therefore required in the regulatory contract to ensure the sustainable operation of the metro. 
The government subsidy consists of train service subsidy (TSS) and equipment replacement subsidy 
(ERS).  TSS recovers the difference between income and cost on service provision.  The cost on service 
provision mainly contains staff salaries, electricity costs of facility and equipment.  ERS recovers the 
expenditure on equipment replacement.  TSS and ERS are negotiated separately because of their different 
natures. 
In Beijing metro, TSS adopts fixed-price contract, in which the local government compensates the 
operating companies on a yearly basis according to a fixed payment (Bajari & Tadelis, 2011).  On the 
other hand, ERS adopts cost-plus contract, in which the local government compensates the operating 
companies according to the final cost.  Under the cost-plus contract, the company profits are independent 
of the final costs (Diekmann, 1981).  Hence, operating companies have no incentive to reduce the costs 
on equipment replacement by regularly maintaining equipment (Tian, 2011).  
ERS in Beijing metro rose sharply from RMB̞107 million in 2008 to RMB̞791 million in 2010 
(Yang, 2011).  With the rapid development of Beijing metro, the amount will be further increased in the 
near future.  The government therefore aims to reduce ERS without compromising service quality and 
safety.   ERS depends on the required equipment reliability and quality, current equipment condition, 
extent and level of maintenance work, and external factors such as fluctuation of equipment prices.  For 
public transportation, reliability and quality should not be compromised.  Current equipment condition 
and external factors are uncontrollable.  It is therefore desirable to encourage better equipment 
maintenance to reduce the ERS. 
The literature on incentive regulation argues that fixed-price contract gives more incentives to reduce 
costs than cost-plus contract (Laffont & Tirole, 1986; Aubert & Reynaud, 2005; Gagnepain & Ivaldi, 
2002).  Under the fixed-price contract, any increase or decrease of equipment replacement cost amounts 
to a change in the profit of operating companies.  Once ERS adopts a fixed-price contract, the operating 
companies are then encouraged to reduce the cost on equipment replacement by making more effort on 
equipment maintenance.  However, the process of negotiating the amount of ERS under fixed-price 
contract is rather tedious and time-consuming.  During the process of negotiating, the government usually 
does not have adequate knowledge, such as current equipment condition, to estimate the cost on 
equipment replacement.  It is possible that the agreed amount of ERS is much higher than the final cost.  
In such situation, the government needs to pay more on ERS than that under a cost-plus contract.  On the 
other hand, it is also possible that the agreed amount of ERS is much lower than the final cost because of 
external factors.  One good example is a drastic increase of equipment prices because of foreign exchange 
fluctuation.  Once this happens, the quality and safety of metro service may be lowered due to the limited 
budget.  A proper incentive, which encourages the operating companies to reduce the cost on equipment 
replacement as well as being able to be more adaptive to external factors to avoid the level of service 
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safety and quality being jeopardized, is therefore required in the subsidy contract of equipment 
replacement. 
This paper proposes introduction of an incentive scheme in the subsidy contract of equipment 
replacement.  The government first pays an agreed price according to the required level of equipment 
reliability and quality and then shares the deviation between the final cost and the agreed price with the 
operating companies.  With such incentive, the operating companies are willing to reduce ERS by 
improving equipment maintenance, as the reduction is positively correlated with their profits.  A study is 
conducted here to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive scheme and its sensitivity to 
external factors, in comparison with cost-plus and fixed-price contracts. 
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the background of equipment replacement 
organization in Beijing metro system is presented.  In Section 3, the description of an incentive scheme to 
reduce the government subsidy on equipment replacement is given.  The case studies of the proposed 
incentive scheme are discussed in Section 4.  Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5. 
2. Organization of equipment replacement in Beijing metro system 
In Beijing, investment, construction and operation of the metro system are separately delegated to 
different companies.  BII is the sole investor of the Beijing metro system.  As the owner, BII is also 
responsible for nominating professional companies to look after construction and operation of Beijing 
metro system.  Authorized by BII, Beijing Railway Construction & Management Company (BRCM) and 
Beijing MTR Corporation Limited Company (BJMTR) are managing the constructions of Beijing metro 
system.  BRCM is a state-owned company and BJMTR is a semi-private company.  The service provision 
and equipment replacement are delegated to two operating companies.  BJMTR is responsible for service 
provision and equipment replacement of two lines and Beijing Subway Company (BSC) owned by the 
local government is responsible for that of the other lines. 
The procedure of equipment replacement in Beijing metro system is explained in Fig. 1. The operating 
companies BSC and BJMTR are responsible for making annual plans of equipment replacement projects,  
 
  
Fig. 1. Flow chart of equipment replacement in Beijing metro system 
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Fig.2. Government subsidy on equipment replacement in Beijing metro system 
 
according to the current equipment condition and the equipment reliability and quality required by the 
government.  The annual plans are submitted to BII for preliminary examination.  Beijing Municipal 
Bureau of Finance (BMBF) and Beijing Municipal Commission of Transport (BMCT) check the 
necessity of each project and the rationale of project budget in turn.  BMBF then transfers the annual 
government subsidy on equipment replacement to BII in accordance with the approved projects.  The 
operating companies BSC and BJMRT then conduct the approved projects according to their budgets.  
ERS is paid monthly to operating companies at cost.   
In this setup, the profit of the operating companies has no connection to the final cost on equipment 
replacement.  Therefore, there are no incentive for them to reduce the ER cost and the corresponding ERS.  
Worse still, they may tend to reduce the effort on equipment maintenance, which leads to an increase of 
cost on equipment replacement.  On the other hand, BMCT and BMBF usually lack sufficient knowledge 
on current condition and market prices of equipment.  It is very difficult for them to evaluate the 
justifications of the projects.  The government administrations are not in the best position to reduce the 
subsidy claimed by operating companies.  As a result, ERS has increased significantly in recent years, as 
shown in Fig. 2.  
3. Incentive scheme  
With the development of Beijing metro system, the ERS will only rise further.  Beijing government 
aims to reduce ERS by encouraging operating companies to put more effort on equipment maintenance.  
It is not practical to set a direct reward or penalty according to the effort of operating companies because 
any evaluation of effort on equipment maintenance is very difficult.  However, it is feasible to encourage 
operating companies to put more resource on equipment maintenance by giving back a portion of cost 
reduction to operating companies as their profits.   
3.1. Development of incentive scheme 
The underlying principle of the incentive scheme is that the government first pays an agreed price 
according to the required level of equipment reliability and quality, and then shares the deviation between 
the final cost and the agreed price with operating companies. 
In the proposed incentive scheme, the portions that operating companies share in cost reduction or 
increment, as well as the agreed price, are the parameters to be determined.   Under fixed-price contract, it 
is very common to determine the price according to the cost in the past few years.  This method could 
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also be applied to determine the agreed price in the proposed incentive scheme, which is shown as 
follows: 
 -1 (1 ) (1 )nL C D G u  u     (1) 
where, L and Cn-1 denote the agreed price and the cost of equipment replacement the previous year 
respectively; Įrepresents consumer price index (CPI), which reflects the change of equipment price; G  
denotes the relative change of projected traffic volume in the current year from the actual figure last year.  
The agreed price may deviate from the value computed in equation (1), if there is an agreement between 
the operating companies and the government. 
In this paper, the portions of operating companies shared in cost reduction and increment are denoted 
by Ȝ and ȝ, respectively.  They are the bonus and penalty coefficients.  The values of Ȝandȝ are defined to 
range from 0 to 1.  Under the proposed incentive scheme, the government subsidy on equipment 
replacement S is described as below.  
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where, C represents the final cost on equipment replacement.  For operating companies, the net income on 
equipment replacements N is described as follows:  
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O
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 ® ¯
                                                        (3) 
According to the equation (3), the relationship between net income of the operating companies and 
final cost on equipment replacement is described in Fig. 3.  The net income of operating companies is 
negative correlated with the final cost.  In other words, the operating companies are willing to reduce the 
cost as much as possible to maximize their net income. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Relationship between net income of operating companies and final cost on ER 
3.2. Effect of incentive scheme  
In the proposed scheme, the final subsidy of government depends heavily on the agreed price and final 
cost.  The final cost on equipment replacement when operating companies have no incentive to reduce 
ERS is denoted by C0.  The minimum cost on equipment replacement when operating companies are 
willing to reduce ERS is denoted by Ca, which is always lower than C0.  There are three scenarios for the 
agreed price: 
(1) Ca<L<C0. This is the most probable situation, when the estimation of government on final cost is 
generally accurate.  The relationship between the government subsidy and the final cost on equipment 
replacement is described in Fig. 4.  Generally, possible cost on equipment replacement ranges from Ca to 
C0.  Under the proposed incentive scheme, operating companies always choose to minimize the cost, 
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which maximize their net income.  Thus, the government subsidy can be expressed as Ca+Ȝ(L-Ca), 0<Ȝ<1.  
Getting a portion of cost reduction, the government subsidy is higher than Ca but lower than L.  
Considering there are no invectives under cost-plus contract, the government subsidy under cost-plus 
contract is denoted by C0.  Assuming that the agreed price under fixed-price contract and the proposed 
incentive scheme are the same, the government subsidy under fixed-price contract is denoted by L.  
Therefore, the government subsidy under the proposed incentive scheme is always lower than that under 
cost-plus and fixed-price contracts.   
 
                    
       Fig. 4. Relationship between government subsidy 
and final cost on ER (Ca < L < C0) 
       Fig. 5. Relationship between government subsidy 
and final cost on ER (L < Ca)
 
(2) L<Ca. Usually, the operating companies are unwilling to accept an agreed price that is lower than 
the minimum cost they could achieve.  However, this situation still exists because of fluctuation of 
equipment price.  In such case, the government subsidy under fixed-price contract is the minimum one 
among the three discussed contracts, as shown in Fig. 5.  The government subsidy under the proposed 
incentive scheme is higher than that under fixed-price contract but lower than that under cost-plus 
contract. 
(3) L>C0. In this situation, the agreed price is very high.  It may exist when the government estimates 
the cost on equipment replacement at an information disadvantage.  There are two different cases in this 
situation, as shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.  In the case of C0 <L<Ca+(C0-Ca)/Ȝ, the government subsidy 
under the proposed incentive scheme is lower than that under cost-plus and fixed-price contracts.  
However, in the case of L>=Ca+(C0-Ca)/Ȝ, the government subsidy under the cost-plus contract is the 
minimum one among the three discussed contracts.  The government subsidy under proposed incentive 
scheme is higher than that under cost-plus contract but lower than that under fixed-price contract.  
 
0( )/a aC C C O                           0( )/a aC C C O    
Fig. 6. Relationship between government subsidy and 
final cost on ER (C0 < L < Ca+(C0-Ca)/Ȝ) 
Fig. 7. Relationship between government subsidy and 
final cost on ER (Lt  Ca+(C0-Ca)/Ȝ)
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To summarize, the proposed incentive scheme is able to reduce government subsidy in most cases 
except when the agreed price is extraordinarily high or low, i.e. L<Ca and L>Ca+(C0-Ca)/Ȝ.  Even in such 
situations, the government subsidy under the proposed incentive scheme is not the highest compared with 
that under cost-plus and fixed-price contracts.   
4. Case studies 
The analysis above shows that the proposed incentive scheme outperforms the cost-plus and fixed-
price contracts at reducing government subsidy.  However, government subsidy is not the only criterion to 
determine the choice of a contractual form.  Case studies through simulation are undertaken in this section 
to comprehensively evaluate the effects of three discussed contracts, considering both government 
subsidy and sensitivity to external factors.   
4.1. Simulation set up 
The parameters in the proposed incentive scheme are given in table 1.  The initial agreed price L is 
assumed equal to C0, which represents the cost of operating companies on equipment replacement under 
the cost-plus contract.  According to the definition, the values of bonus and penalized coefficients, Ȝ and 
μ, range from 0 to 1.  In this paper, they are both selected as 0.5.  Further studies to optimize these two 
parameters will be undertaken in the future but are not included in this paper.  
Operating companies surrender a certain amount of expenditure when they carry out equipment 
maintenance to reduce equipment replacement cost.  Generally, the more the operating companies spend 
on equipment maintenance, the more reduction on replacement cost they may achieve.  However, the 
reduction is slower than the increase when the effort on equipment maintenance reaches at a certain level.  
To reflect this characteristic, the relationship between the reduction of the cost on equipment replacement 
İ and the expenditure on equipment maintenance ( )\ H  is defined in the following equation, quoted from 
reference (Wu, 2011). 
2( ) 0.005 0\ H H H !                                                               (4) 
There are also external factors on the final equipment replacement cost, such as fluctuation of the 
equipment price.  Usually, the fluctuation follows the normal distribution (Wu, 2011).  In this paper, the 
probability distribution of the external factors on equipment replacement cost is given in table 2, where T  
denotes the change of cost because of external factors and P denotes the corresponding probability.  
 
Table 1. Parameters selection in incentive scheme 
C0 L Ȝ μ 
800 800 0.5 0.5 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the external influence factors on ER cost 
T  (Million RMB) -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 
P 0.075 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.075 
 
4.2. Results and analysis 
The comparisons of government subsidy and net income of operating companies under the incentive 
scheme, cost-plus and fixed-price contracts are discussed here.  Fig. 8 gives the changes of government 
subsidy and net income of operating companies with different extents of equipment maintenance work.  It 
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shows that there is an optimal extent of equipment maintenance work, which should be chosen by 
operating companies to maximize their net income while the government subsidy is minimized.  In other 
words, the proposed incentive scheme is able to encourage operating companies to choose proper extent 
of equipment maintenance work, which helps reduce ERS. 
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Fig. 8. Relationships among government subsidy and net income and effort on ER of operating companies 
 
 
Fig. 9 gives the changes of government subsidy and net income of operating companies considering 
different extents of external factors influencing on ER cost.  When the external factors lead to a drastic 
reduction on ER cost, the government subsidies under incentive scheme and cost-plus contract are much 
lower than that under fixed-price contract.  When the external factors give a drastic increase on ER cost, 
the government subsidies under incentive scheme and fixed-price contract are very low.  However, the net 
income of operating companies may be negative, especially under the fixed-price contract.  The reason is 
that no matter how hard the operating companies work on equipment maintenance, the final cost is still 
higher than the agreed price.  High negative net income may lead to deteriorated metro service and 
quality,   which is not what the government intends.  On the contrary, under the cost-plus contract, the net 
income of operating companies is always non-negative although the government subsidy is very high.  In 
other words, the cost-plus contract enables the operating companies to absorb extreme fluctuation of 
external factors and avoid any negative influences on metro service.  In summary, the incentive scheme 
outperforms the cost-plus and fixed-price contracts on reducing ERS, and it is more adaptive to external 
factors on upholding metro quality than fixed-price contract, though not as well as cost-plus contract is. 
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To comprehensively evaluate the sensitivity to external factors of the three types of contracts, the net 
income of operating companies, which may carry an impact on metro service and government subsidy are 
combined to one indicator, the expectation of government EU.  The method of calculating EU is 
described in the equation below, which reflects the government’s intention to reduce ERS while the 
quality and safety of service should not be compromised. 
         
2
1600 1.5*   if 0
1600 1.5*  if 0
S N N
EU
S N N
  !­
 ®   d¯
                                                       (5) 
Fig. 10 shows the change of government expectation with different extents of external factors 
influencing on ER cost.  It indicates that incentive scheme is more adaptive to external factors than cost-
plus and fixed-price contracts, considering both government subsidy and possible effect on metro service.   
The information on metro equipments owned by government and operating companies is rather 
asymmetrical.  The agreed price may deviate from the reasonable price.  Fig. 11 shows the changes of 
government expectations and subsidies with different agreed prices.  When the agreed price is severely 
underestimated, the government subsidy under fixed-price contract is lower than that under incentive 
scheme and cost-plus contract.  However, in such case, the net income of operating companies is negative, 
which is the reason that the government expectation is lower than that under incentive scheme and cost-
plus contract.  When the agreed price is severely overestimated, the cost-plus is the best form of contract 
since the government subsidy is lower than that under incentive scheme and fixed-price contract.  With 
the exception of the aforementioned cases, the government subsidy under incentive scheme is lower than 
that under other two contacts, which verifies the argument in section 4. 
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Fig. 11. Relationships among government expectations and subsidies and agreed prices  
5. Conclusions 
Beijing metro system is playing a very critical role in the city public transportation.  With the rapid 
growth of Beijing metro systems and the corresponding ERS, an appropriate contract or scheme on 
equipment replacement is required to reduce the government subsidy while service safety and quality are 
not compromised.  This paper proposes an incentive scheme, in which the government first pays an 
agreed price and then shares the deviation of the final cost from the agreed price with the operating 
company.  Simulation results suggest that the proposed incentive scheme encourages operating companies 
to reduce their cost and the corresponding amount of government subsidies.  The proposed incentive 
scheme is also more tolerant to external factors and unreasonable agreed price.   
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